This paper presents the mechanism of the boom -bust cycles in the context of domestic and international financial liberalization in the developing countries, and the effects of crises and exchange rate volatility on functional income distribution based on the case of Turkey, who has experienced two severe crises in 1994 and 2001 after the liberalization of capital flows, and who has also been hit the hardest during the May-June 2006 turbulences. The paper analyses the recent turbulences in the global economy and their consequences in the emerging markets as a case study to illustrate the endogenous formation of expectations. The recovery in Turkey after the turmoil is not based on a solution to the source of the problem, since it has completely depended on the reversal of the capital outflows, whose continuity is far from clear.
Introduction
Many developing countries shared the common destiny of financial crises in the 1990s and From Latin America to Asia, financial capital flows have generated simultaneously phases of boom and systemic fragility, which then were typical ly followed by a bust. The bust phase has been an endogenous outcome of the boom phase in the sense that the fragility of the system is a result of the "success" of the system. The length and depth of both the boom and bust phases may vary depending on the size of the vulnerability and the shock. But expectations, whose evolution is not easy to forecast, play an important role.
Although the systemic fragility can be prevented by limiting the area of risk taking behavior , thus regulating the financial markets, financial liberalization creates interests that also prevent the regulation of these markets. In that sense the boom-bust cycles are not distribution neutral.
The paper addresses the distributional consequences of the crises for the case of Turkey.
The paper exists of seven sections including this introductory one. Section two describes the hypothesis of systemic financial fragility and the boom-bust cycles in the developing countries, which have opened up their economies to international capital flows. Section three discusses the historical evidence from Turkey, as a case to illustrate the mechanism discussed in Section two. Section three analyses the recent turbulences in the global economy and their consequences in the emerging markets as a case st udy to illustrate the endogenous formation of expectations. Section four discusses again the effects more specifically based on the case of Turkey. Section five analyses the effects of crises and exchange rate volatility on functional income distribution in Turkey. Finally the concluding section drives the policy implications of the analysis.
Boom-bust cycles in the developing countries
This section presents the mechanism of the boom-bust cycles in the context of domestic and international financial liberalization. The theory behind is an open economy extension of the post-Keynesian systemic financial fragility and instability hypothes es of Minsky (1982 Minsky ( , 1986 . Based on the analysis of the currency crises since the 1997 Asian crisis, Arestis and Glickman (2002) , Schroeder (2002) , Foley (2003) , Dymski (1999) , Kregel (1998) , Taylor (1998), and Isik (2004) have presented a Minskyan analysis of the financial crises in the developing countries.
The boom and bust cycles are based on the linkages between financial and real variables, and develop endogenously out of the normal functioning of the economy. If good performance persists, investors become more optimistic and are willing to hold more risky assets or accept higher levels of debt. They engage in speculative financing patterns based on short -term financing of investment projects with long time horizons. This makes the firms vulnerable to credit availability and interest rate shocks, which leads to financial instability. In time, when there is a negative shock, and expectations evolve in a pessimistic direction, this fragility leads to a crisis through credit crunch, debt crisis, and bankruptcies. The fragility is always there, but a shock turns it into a crisis. The source of the shock, which causes the crash, is not important. It is the built in vulnerability that leads to a significant effect of the shock.
Four properties of expectation formation play an important role in this process. First, expectations are formed under fundamental uncertainty and therefore, agents are influenced by conventional wisdom, such that everyone is trying to guess what everyone else will guess. Thus it's about inves tor sentiment, not fundamentals. Second, competitive pressures among firms or fund managers push them to take similar risks, even when they would rather be more conservative. Thus conventional wisdom, i.e. expectations, is also competition coerced (Crotty 1993). Third, expectations are self-fulfilling. A phase of optimism leads to gradually more boom-euphoric expectations, increasing the risk appetite of the investors. Fourth, expectations are endogenously evolving, and not static. Thus e valuations about what is reasonable change. Good times lead to a self propelling adventurism and as expected profits are realized, investors become more self-confident in taking risks. But the opposite mechanism also works. Over-optimism increases financial fragility, and finally when an adverse shock comes, this fragility becomes visible to the investors. The shift to overpessimism makes an expected crisis come true. After the crash and crisis, the investors will be cautious for a while, but eventually after enough time has passed, competitive pressures and new search for profitable investment will start a new endogenous cycle of stability, to be followed by instability.
In the developing countries, the boom-bust cycles were triggered by both domestic and international financial liberalization. First the domestic financial markets have been liberalized. The increases in the real deposit and loan interest rates and the deregulation of financial institutions have set the initial conditions for the formation of fragility. R iskier credit supply by the banks , a shift to financial investments at the expense of physical investments by th e investors, short-termism, and an adverse-selection towards riskier projects with a higher expected return have been the outcome (Grabel, 1995) .
When the international capital flows are liberalized at the later stage, high domestic interest rates attracted high capital inflows thanks to a high financial arbitrage between the interest rate and exchange rate due to an initially low expected depreciation. Most of these capital flows to developing countries have been portfolio investments or short -term credit. As capital inflows trigger growth in a country, boom euphoric expectations and competitive international pressures lead to further capital inflows. However this leads to the appreciation of the local currency, which in turn results in an increasing for eign trade deficit. In the meantime in addition to the maturity imbalances of the closed economy, currency mismatches in the firms' balance sheets, which borrow in foreign currency and invest in domestic currency, create new sources of fragility. The high domestic interest rates compared to the foreign currency interest rates and the low expected depreciation rate of the currency is the motivation behind this financing pattern. The public sector may also be highly indebted as was the case in Turkey, but this has not been the situation in many other cases , like the Asian countries. As risks build up and in particular currency appreciation and the consequent current account deficit increases beyond a c ritical point, international investors become slowly aware of the problems. However, this critical point also may change endogenously. The combination of some adverse shocks like the bankruptcy of a firm or a bank, or problems in the export markets, neighbor country, world economy, or in the domestic political arena may turn this awareness into a speculation about a possible devaluation. The Central Bank may increase the interest rate in order to avoid capital outflow and to satisfy higher risk perceptions regarding expected depreciations. However this in the meant ime intensifies the debt problem. Finally, the conventional wisdom starts to evolve towards pessimism and investors decide to leave the country, before everybody else does so. In the end an expected depreciation becomes a selffulfilling prophecy. Imported input costs increase due to depreciation with a pass-through effect on inflation. This cost shock and high interest rates lead to bankruptcies , credit crunch, and recession. The debt problem becomes magnified by economic recession and depreciation. The accumulated risks associated with an appreciated currency, high current account deficit, combined with the mismanagement of the domestic borrowing policy by the government, who 6% (1989-93) . At the end of 1999 the government decided to implement an anti-inflation program within the context of a stand-by agreement with the IMF.
The program was based on a crawling peg exchange rate regime, using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to arrest inflation Turkey among other emerging markets have been the determining source of finance for achieving this growth rate. This is to some extent similar to what had happened also after the 1994 crisis thanks to the deflated prices in the asset markets, the depreciation of the currency making asset prices once again lower in terms of foreign currency, and also creating a guarantee that the exchange rate will be stable or even appreciate in the coming period.
Additionally the EU anchor was a significant factor in securing the capital flows in the period after 2001. The result was typically a continual depreciation in currency; at the end of 2005 TL was 47.4% appreciated compared to 2001; and the current account deficit had reached to a historically high level of 6.4% as a ratio to GNP. Nevertheless, at that time talking about the risks associated with such a high current account deficit seemed to be a complete heterodoxy.
The market sentiments celebrated this period as a completely new era, where the EU anchor is playing an important role in decreasing political risks, and creating the potential for a higher FDI inflow. The optimists also emphasized that the current account deficit is financing new private investments, which would eventually improve competitiveness and exports. The government mostly calculated the effect of increasing oil prices to excuse for the increase in current account deficit, and seemed to be particularly trustin g the flexible exchange rate system for a corrective capacity and taming speculative expectations.
2006 and global turbulences
The optimism about the starting of a new era in the The May-June 2006 turbulences were short-lived in the sense that the investors soon started to enjoy the low asset prices even in the riskiest markets like Turkey after the initial panic.
Moreover since the continuity of the global harmony is the guarantee of the profitability of the international financial investors, and optimism and aggressive risky investment behavior looks for reasons to explain why the mechanism will not break down, the coercive competitive pressures led the conventional wisdom to shift again towards buoyancy. Indeed it was defined as "a bit of profit-taking" afterwards, and this had seemed to be rational to do in order to gather the potential profits due to the unforeseen increases in the emerging market share prices during the last couple of years. The editorial of The Economist (2006b) also changed its evaluation of the financial flows in a month's time by calling what happened "a drama not a crisis" and writing that this is perhaps "a measure of the growing maturity of emerging markets that before anyone could coin a name for (inevitably terming it a "crisis") a recovery of sorts had begun." A kind of a consensus also exists that there's only real reason for concern if one believes that the world is going into a global recession. But so far this is a possibility that the market professionals have to rule out in order not to shift to overly conservative investment practices too early in time, which would then make them deliver lower profits to their customers compared to their competitor dealers, who have a higher risk appetite.
Going back to our original question about understanding the formation of expectations in the international financial markets, now we can evaluate whether expectations are rational and based on fundamentals, or whether they are norm determined and swing along with the ups and downs in the 'sentiments' and 'appetite' of the investors. It is already raising doubts about the objectiveness of the expectations, when the descriptions of the markets in the business press start sounding like a doctor describing a case of psychiatry, using words like "the mood of the markets," "nervous," "tense". As the optimistic conventional wisdom shifts towards conventional panic , triggered by an ever changing critical turning point in the risk indicators, the endogenous cycles of over-optimism and over-pessimism generate parallel cycles of stability and instability. In the next years, what this means for the world economy and the developing countries will depend on how quick the global savings imbalances will be corrected, how deep the accompanying US recession will be, and last but not the least how the markets will perceive the consequences of it for the developing countries.
Turkey amid global turbulences: To learn or not to learn from history
As we discussed in section 3, Turkey was already in a fragile position in terms of its dependency on the capital flows due to its high current account deficit, and the appreciation of the currency was at risky levels. However, this position was not shared by most of the analysts. For e.g. The Economist (2006c) writes that "when Joseph Quilan, a strategist at the Bank of America Capital Management described Turkey in March as 'the weak link in the merging market chain,' few investors listened," however then in the period after May 11, "…his words have sounded prophetic. Turkey has been among the hardest-hit of emerging markets since May 11." Some analysts perceived of this shock as "just a correction", which may help to restore equilibrium. Regarding the turmoil that followed, many like Sonal Desai, However as Serhan Cevik, an economist at Morgan Stanley, says, there is not "any reason why the country's political risk should be higher now than it was a year ago" (reported by Boland, 2006a) . But then the more surprising and scary point is may be "… that investors remained sanguine for so long," as The Economist more cautiously suggests. Indeed regarding economic policy the government has followed and is content to follow a fully neoliberal program, as also supported by the IMF and the EU (Independent Social Scientists, 2006; Voyvoda and Yeldan, 2005; Yeldan, 2007) ; and economic policy is rather a conflict free area between the government, business circles, and the military elite, despite the political conflicts between them 6 . Even if IMF had raised doubts about the VAT cuts and its 6 The conflicts on the appointment of the Central Bank president ealier in 2006 may sound like conflicts over economic policy. But indeed rather than being disputes over the content of the policies, these are power struggles implications for the primary budget surplus during its visit to review a loan agreement, which unfortunately had also coincided with the most turbulent days in May, thus a time when more supportive IMF declarations could have been expected in order not to disturb the credibility of the economic program, it should be stated that the government is expected to achieve a significantly high primary budget surplus of 6.5% as a ratio to GDP in 2007, and the same which turned out to be well below the forecasts of the market analysts, indicate that the effect of the May-June turbulences on the real economy has been more severe than expect ed (Yapi Kredi Bank, 2007) . The source of the slow down has been the services sector, which implies that the lagged response in industry and construction can further the slow down in the following periods. On the expenditure side the quick reaction came from the consumption demand, and the effects on investment are yet to be seen once the firms complete their previously planned investment projects.
In order to understand the full potential of the real effects of further exchange rate volatility in the future, a closer look at the investment and financing behavior of the non-financial business sector is important. Fragility in Turkey had been formerly mostly based on the budget deficits of the public sector, the current account deficits, and the open foreign exchange position of the banking sector. As of 2007, public budget deficit is quite under control; the banking sector has seemed to have learned to hedge its foreign exchange risks 7 based on the lessons driven from the 2001 crisis. However, this time it is the private non-financial business sector, which is exposed to a significant degree of foreign exchange risk. Indeed this shaky finance strategy is the risk that is hidden behind the seemingly successful investment performance of the private sector. It is true that private investment in both machinery and construction has been recovering from the effects of the 2001 crisis as well as the former downward trend since the 1999 earthquake (see Figure 3) . Particularly the increase in investment in machinery and equipment, although it has stagnated at a level of 9.5% as a ratio to GNP as of 2006
September, a level still lower than its peak in 1997, is the source of the hope that investment in new capacity will also help to improve productivity and international competitiveness of
Turkey. Yet this increase in investment is financed by increasing indebtedness of the private sector, particularly in the foreign markets. Figure 4 shows the changes in the foreign debt of the public vs. private sector as a ratio to GNP. The total foreign debt to GNP ratio is overall at a very high level of 51.4% making the economy fragile to exchange rate shocks.
Finally Figure 5 shows the short foreign exchange position of the non-banking sector as a ratio to GNP, international reserves, and exports of goods and services. All three ratios point at the increasing relative size of the short position of firms. The ratio of short foreign exchange position of the non-banking sector to expor ts of goods and services has increased from 28.1% in 2005 December to 39.8% as of 2006 September, indicating an increased degree of currency mismatch in the balance sheet of the firms. Moreover, Central Bank has been pointing at the fact that this aggregate figure hides the heterogeneity among the firms in the sense that the risks should be much higher for firms with low export revenue, who have failed to hedge their borrowing with future income. These developments make the question of the sustainability of the capital flows and the exchange rate vital for Turkey. 
Functional income distribution through the boom-bust cycles in Turkey
Some domestic and foreign investors can make gains over the boom-bust cycles by buying and selling the domestic currency denominated assets at the right time, and when the bust arrives, there are winners and losers of this process, but this is not necessarily a conflict between financia l vs. non-financial profit income in the aggregate. Labor's share decline in all countries that have experienced currency crises (Onaran, 2006b) , and this decline in labor's share then compensates for the increase in financial costs for industrial firms. Evidence also suggests that industrial firms also find the chance to increase their returns from financial activities.
The crises of both 1994 and 2001 have led to a clear and long lasting decline in the wage share in Turkey. Figure 6 shows the wage share in manufacturing industry 9
. The percentage decrease in the wage share by far exceeds the rate of decline in production during the crises.
After a crisis, employers push worker s to accept dramatic wage cuts or compulsory unpaid leaves to avoid job losses. Eventually profits are restored and when the crisis is long past, it is labor, which has carried the burden of adjustment. The crisis also creates a negative effect on the bargaining power of labor for a long period afterwards. Diwan (2001) defines crises as episodes of distributional fights, which leave "distributional scars". Although a strong economic recovery takes place after the crisis, with production returning to its pre-crisis level within a year, the fall in the wage share is much more persistent. Due to lack of long time series data for wages, the analysis here is based on the manufacturing industry. The wage share data for the rest of the economy exists only from 1987 onwards.
after the 1994 crisis was rather slow, with the wage share in 2000 still below the previous peak of 1991. Thus in most of the years, the wage share did not increase when the economy was growing, but responded strongly to a crisis.
One important factor that has led to the deterioration in la bor's share during the crises is the exchange rate movements. Also apart from the crisis episodes, the opening up of the econom y was accompanied by significant devaluations of the domestic currency with the aim of achieving higher international competitiveness. Be it due to the official devaluations of the early stages of liberalization or the market made depreciations after the financial crises, there is a clear trade -off between the rate of depreciation and the wage share. Depreciation creates an increase in the price of the imported goods , and thus in overall input costs. Depending on the balance of power relations, the firms try to compensate the increase in input costs by a decline in labor costs. Also firms can reflect the costs to their prices within the limits of their oligopolistic power, but the workers under the threat of job loss during a crisis mostly fail to reflect the consequent price shocks to their nominal wages. The reverse of this story has also been true during episodes of capital inflow, and appreciation of the currency, when employers became more accommodative towards wage demands , for e.g. during the episode of 1989-93.
However, this was soon disturbed by the currency crises. Table 1 Table 1 The data necessary to analyze the effect of the recent turbulences on the distribution of income was not available at the time when this article was written, since both the annual industry surveys and the national accounts based on income approach, which are the source of the relevant data, only cover a period until December 2005. But the quarterly manufacturing industry surveys, which report real earnings, even if not value added, indicate only a minor decline of 0.2% in real earnings in the third quarter of 2006 compared to the same quarter of the previous year. Given the increases in productivity this nevertheless corresponds to a decline in the wage share. However it is too early to say much on the further distributional effects, since wage bargaining process also needs some time to adjust to the shock.
Conclusion
The global turbulences of May-June 2006 and the massive, though temporary, capital outflows from the developing countries have once again raised doubts about the sustainability of a growth process dependent on capital inflows. The recovery in Turkey after the turmoil is not based on a solution to the source of the problem, since it has completely depended on the reversal of the capital outflows, whose continuity is far from clear. A new wave of speculative financial capital outflows from the emerging markets, which may be followed by further turbulences given the global imbalances, remain to be a significant risk factor, particularly for the most fragile cases like Turkey. In May, neither the high financial arbitrage nor the EU-anchor has protected Turkey against the capital outflows from the emerging markets. EU-anchor has indeed failed to protect even Hungary, who is a member state. If the conventional wisdom of the markets shifts from optimism to pessimism, can the EU anchor help Turkey at all, particularly when relations with the EU are getting tenser? Would the markets care whether the appreciation of the currency is a natural catching up phenomenon (Balassa-Samuelson effect) or the prospects for FDI inflows are improving or increased investments financed by imports will eventually help the country to cover the current account deficit in the future? The evaluation of the financial investors at critical turning points in the future will certainly depend on the recent history and how badly they were punished by volatility. Now that the boom has been underway for a long time, and the recent turbulences had had rather a pr ofit taking effect than punishing effect for the investors, a radical shift to over -pessimism can be postponed for another while, although investors are already quite cautious. However, the question is whether the possibility can be ruled out completely.
Simply ignoring the possibility of a massive outflow, which will trigger deeper real effects in the future, seems to be gambling in policy making. This behavior is more like ignoring a gas leakage in your house, and choosing a "wait and see" strategy, rather than trying to fix the leakage. Sound policy requires taking the global turbulences and their consequences serious and considering them as cases in defense of financial regulation and international capital controls. Financial regulation along with industrial policy is the only long run policy alternative to prevent financial fragility and the potential reasons of a future crisis. 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Source: Own calculations based on data supplied by the State Institute of Statistics. The data for the wage share in manufacturing in the national accounts exist for the period after 1996 at a sectoral level. This data is linked with the data in the Industrial Survey for the period before. 
